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Abstract  
Several theory-of-mind (ToM) studies have explored how children differentiate ordinary minds 
(humans, dogs) and extraordinary minds (God, spirits), but these studies have yielded divergent 
results and interpretations and have not offered cross-cultural comparisons of samples. To 
address these limitations, children (3-5 years old) in four different countries (United Kingdom, 
Israel, Dominican Republic, and Kenya) were given a knowledge-ignorance ToM task and asked 
to reason about the minds of various ordinary and extraordinary minds, depending upon the 
culture. All children were asked about a human and God. Results revealed within-group 
differences based upon age for the human and for God for some samples, but not all; and results 
showed between-group differences for how children treated God’s mind and human minds (as 
well as other extraordinary minds). The within-group different response patterns across age is 
not surprising if ToM is considered a developmental accomplishment, improving with age. But 
the differences in response patterns between samples points to a larger role culture plays for 
children’s understandings of extraordinary minds such as God’s.  
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Fundamental to children’s ability to understand the social world is the development of 1 
theory of mind (ToM), that is, the ability to read the intentions, desires, beliefs, knowledge, 2 
perspectives, or mental states of others (Flavell, 2004; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 3 
Thirty-five years of research has revealed an increasingly complex picture of ToM 4 
development, and more recently, ToM studies have begun to take seriously a broader 5 
understanding of the social world, a world including nonhuman minds: pets, wild animals, 6 
gods, angels, spirits, even fictional characters and imaginary friends are just some of the 7 
other types of minds that may populate a child’s socio-cultural landscape. Given that some 8 
of these minds that are believed to possess extraordinary powers (e.g., God knows what is in 9 
your heart; an angel announces the future), this research is particularly relevant to the 10 
development of religious beliefs in children. 11 
Even so, the research into these nonhuman and extraordinary minds (Barrett, Newman, & 12 
Richert, 2003; Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001; Giménez-Dasí, Guerrero, & Harris, 13 
2005; Kiessling & Perner, 2014; Knight, 2008; Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, 2004; Lane, 14 
Wellman, & Evans, 2010, 2012; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007; Nyhof & Johnson,2017; 15 
Richert & Barrett, 2005; Richert, Saide, Lesage, & Shaman, 2017; Wigger, Paxson, & Ryan, 16 
2013) has yielded conflicting results, various interpretations, and little cross-cultural 17 
comparison. For example, in some cases (detailed below) children understood God’s mind 18 
like a human’s mind; in other cases, children differentiated God’s mind from a dog’s or 19 
human’s. And with the exception of two studies with Mayan children (Knight, 2008; Knight 20 
et al., 2004) and another with Indonesian children (Nyhof & Johnson, 2017) this research 21 
has generally suffered from a lack of attention to socio-cultural context. Not only does this 22 
narrow focus potentially distort a fuller understanding of ToM development across various 23 
cultures, it obscures ToM development in relation to particular extraordinary minds 24 
indigenous to a culture. For example, ancestor spirits of the dead are extremely important in  25 
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some cultures (such as in Kenya, described below). How do children reason about their 
minds? Or, do Orthodox Jewish children think of God’s mind the way Protestant Christian 
children treat God’s mind? Theological differences and religious formation could lead to 
different understandings of “God.” The present study is an attempt to take cultural 
particularity seriously by comparing children’s responses in a ToM task from four very 
different locations: the Dominican Republic, Israel, Kenya, and the United Kingdom. This 
exploration takes seriously the role of the very social world that ToM opens to a child.   
Nonetheless, it could be the case that similar response patterns exist despite culture or 
type of mind, suggesting a relatively universal phenomenon. Perhaps young children 
everywhere, early in development, think about other minds—whether God’s or another 
human’s—in generally the same way. For example, it might be that children egocentrically 
project their own minds (knowledge, intentions, feelings) upon any other mind until they are 
older and can differentiate their own minds from others. Or it could be that a young child 
anywhere around the world intuitively assumes that others know things, have a fuller grasp of 
the world (leading to all those “why” questions young children ask). Either possibility would 
suggest a trans-cultural phenomenon.   
But it could be the case that children’s understandings of extraordinary minds is 
deeply impacted by the beliefs, practices, stories, and rituals of a culture. Perhaps even young 
children perceive God and angels as less limited by time and space—having more powerful 
minds—than ordinary mortals. Or perhaps this is true in some cultures but not others. Such 
differences would suggest a stronger influence from the social world and more flexible and 
various patterns in ToM development.  
  
Background: ToM Studies with Extraordinary Agents  
Over three decades of research suggest that a representational understanding of human minds  
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has some intuitive basis already evident in infancy (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, &  
Brockbank, 1999; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gopnik & Seiver, 2009; Rochat, Morgan, &  
Carpenter, 1997), and that a stable and robust representation develops around the age of 5 
(e.g., Wellman et al., 2001).  However, research regarding children’s developing 
understanding of non-human minds is still relatively new.  In one of the earliest ToM studies 
to examine children’s conceptualizations of the knowledge of extraordinary minds, Barrett et 
al. (2001) gave 3- to 8-year-old children a surprising-contents false-belief task. Children were 
shown that a cracker box contained rocks instead of crackers and that a brown bag contained 
crackers. They were asked where a mother, bear, snake, tree, and God would look first if each 
wanted crackers. Results demonstrated that children of any age overwhelmingly responded 
that God would know the crackers are in the brown bag. But the younger children attributed 
such knowledge to the minds of the other agents as well—a bear or snake would know too. 
Only 5- to 8- year-olds responded that the other agents would be ignorant and look in the 
cracker box whereas God would know what was in the box. Subsequent studies have 
generally replicated the findings of Barrett and colleagues (Barrett et al., 2003; Knight, 2008; 
Knight et al., 2004; Nyhof & Johnson, 2017; Richert & Barrett, 2005; Wigger et al., 2013) in 
that young children tended to attribute knowledge to all minds—God, dogs, bees, imaginary 
friends, and Mayan forest spirits for example. These have been helpful studies for better 
appreciating that children as young as 5 are capable of differentiating an ordinary mind like a 
dog’s from a mind like God’s, an ability Piaget (1929) thought developed in later childhood.   
Even so, other studies using different ToM tests have shown another pattern. Makris 
and Pnevmatikos (2007), among Greek Orthodox children, gave two different ToM tests to 
children. In one test, they also found the same pattern as above when employing a false-belief 
test (children knew a toy was in a box). If the young child knew, a doll and God would also 
know. But in a second ToM test, a knowledge-ignorance task, they found a different pattern.  
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When the child was not shown the contents of a box, 3-year-olds attributed ignorance to the 
doll and to God at high rates. So, when the children knew something, they thought others 
would know; when the children were ignorant, they thought others would not know, even 
God. Subsequent research has demonstrated a similar pattern (Kiessling & Perner, 2013; 
Lane et al., 2010; 2012; and see Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2016, for a review, and 
see also Barlev, Mermelstein, & German, 2017, for work with adults).   
One reason for this variation may be that young children are simply incapable of 
reasoning about other minds. They cannot imagine another point of view than their own. Or it 
could be that they are capable of doing so, but the “curse of knowledge” (Birch, 2005; Birch 
& Bloom, 2003) overwhelms their reasoning abilities. If children know the contents of a box, 
this knowledge of reality may be too great to reason more accurately, a dynamic related to the 
development of executive function in children (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). 
The less developed a child’s executive function, the stronger the pull of reality. But in a 
knowledge ignorance test, there is no pull, no knowledge that has to be suppressed while 
reasoning about other minds.   
Knowledge ignorance tasks, therefore, may be particularly useful for exploring 
whether young children across different cultures consistently attribute ignorance to others. If 
they do, there is strong evidence that young children are simply projecting their own 
knowledge states upon other minds, despite cultural messages or religious formation that may 
even intentionally teach that, for example, “God knows everything.” But if there is variability 
between cultures, then a child’s developing ToM may be more flexible and open to influence 
from the social world. In this case, there would be strong motivation for investigating further 
potential factors impacting the developing ToM, if not the religious and cultural imagination.   
Cross-cultural research into children’s understanding of human (only) minds already 
suggests some variation, with children demonstrating a robust understanding of other minds 
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(e.g. by passing a false-belief test) as early as 3.5 years and as late as 7 years, depending upon 
the country or even location within the same country (Lillard, 1998; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & 
Sabbagh, 2008; Shahaeian et al., 2014; Tardif, Wellman, & Cheung, 2004; Wellman et al., 
2001). Children raised in US and Australia, for example, generally understand others can 
have different beliefs from their own earlier than children raised in Iran (Shahaeian, Nielsen,  
Peterson, Aboutalebi, & Slaughter, 2014; Shahaeian et al., 2014; Shahaeian, Peterson, 
Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011) or China (Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006). The 
rationale given for the differences is cultural, based in the different values of their 
communities, such as high levels of tolerance for disagreement (US and Australia) or 
emphasis upon family unity (Iran and China).   
Nevertheless, no published study has directly compared children’s responses for 
various extraordinary minds from different countries. If early conceptualization of human 
minds is shaped by socio-cultural factors, we might expect there to be variation in how 
children think about a variety of non-human extraordinary minds. Exposure to extraordinary 
minds, such as God or ancestor spirits, requires both particular linguistic and socio-cultural 
experience that exposure to ordinary human or animal minds does not. Ordinary human 
minds are relatively visible, present, and vocal, while extraordinary minds are less available, 
often known only indirectly through testimony, rituals, and practices (Bergstrom,  
Moehlmann, & Boyer, 2006; Harris & Koenig, 2006).  
The Present Study  
The present study explores ToM patterns of development within and across four 
diverse samples. Children 3-5 years of age were given a knowledge-ignorance test that 
required them to reason about both ordinary (human) minds and extraordinary (nonhuman) 
minds. We chose two Protestant Christian samples (the DR and Kenya) for comparisons with 
the UK (the sample most resembling prior studies), so that some degree of group-level 
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comparison could be drawn. We also chose a Jewish sample from Israel as a comparison to 
all three Christian ones. Both Jewish and Christian traditions claim that God is all-powerful 
and all-knowing God, but there are key differences between the traditions. The fact that the 
Christian tradition claims that God became human (Jesus), complicates the distinction 
between human and nonhuman minds, and this could confuse children. Jewish children may 
not have this confusion. Similar work among Muslim children showed clear differentiation in 
their attributions of knowledge to God and humans compared to Christian children (Richert et 
al., 2017). Thus, a child’s developing concept of God may differ according to his/her 
religious tradition and its cultural frames for describing God.   
We also included diverse types of minds for each culture. As in much previous 
research, all children were asked about a human and God. As an exploratory analysis, we also 
asked children about other extraordinary minds specific to their cultural context. For example, 
the DR children are taught both formally and informally about the protection of angels; and 
the Kenyan children are also taught informally about the involvement of ancestor spirits in 
various aspects of life. Angels and ancestors are culturally-endorsed extraordinary beings but 
may or may not necessarily be all-knowing in the same ways as God is considered to be. 
They were chosen in part because of the studies by Knight (2008) and Wigger et al. (2013) 
who found several “in-between” minds (Mayan spirits, Sun, imaginary friends): minds that 
were less likely to have special knowledge than God, but more likely to compared to humans 
or animals (see also Greenway et al. 2017).  
  
Method  
Participants and Countries  
  Overall, 243 children participated in the study.   
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  Dominican Republic. Fifty-one children (28 girls, 23 boys; 3:0 to 5:11; M = 3.96, SD  
= .85) were interviewed. Age groups by year were: 3s (n = 19), 4s (n = 15), and 5s (n = 17).1 
Children were drawn from three different Protestant schools within one hundred miles of the 
capital. Protestant denominations are a religious minority (18%) in the country, with 
Catholicism (69%) being the official religion (USDOS, 2013). Most parents of the children 
had no secondary education (high school). The children we interviewed receive religious 
instruction weekly in church, hear daily readings from the Bible in school, and biblical 
lessons are often integrated into other studies. Children lived in an area where there are high 
rates of poverty, with an average annual income for the country of about $5500 (UNICEF, 
2014). All children completed the task in Spanish.  
  Israel. Sixty-four children (39 girls, 25 boys; 2:11 to 5:6; M = 4.26, SD = .87) from 
Jerusalem, Israel participated. Children were recruited via fliers at local synagogues and with 
the help of the members of each synagogue. Age groups by year were: 3s (n = 23), 4s (n = 
18), and 5s (n = 23). Israeli children all identified as Modern Orthodox Jewish and are 
currently practicing the Jewish faith2. Children participated in weekly Shabbat services and 
most went to mandatory religious classes once a week. Children received informal religious 
education at home. Parents of children were from middle income families, and were highly 
educated with one parent having at least an undergraduate degree.  
The tasks were conducted in the language (English or Hebrew) with which the child 
was most comfortable. Thirty-six children chose to participate in Hebrew.  
                                                 
1 A limitation is that birthdays were not celebrated among the households of the children interviewed in either 
Kenya or the Dominican Republic. Ages (in years only) were provided by the schools and, we believe, represent 
a reasonably accurate method of grouping the children developmentally. Nonetheless, great caution will be 
exercised when drawing general conclusions based upon specific age.  
2 We chose Modern Orthodox Jewish Israeli participants because of their potential openness to discussing 
religion and participating in these experiments. Modern Orthodox Judaism emerged in response to 
nineteenthcentury tensions within Judaism concerning the degree to which embrace or reject modern, secular 
culture. Modern Orthodox Judaism seeks to adhere “to traditional religious commitments while at the same time 
[to] embrace, albeit ambivalently, many aspects of modern culture” (Cohen-Malayev, Assor, & Kaplan, 2009, 
p.237).  
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  Kenya. Fifty-seven Luo children (29 boys, 28 girls; 3:0 years to 5:11 years; M = 4.08 
years, SD = .85) were interviewed. Age groups by year were: 3s (n = 18), 4s (n = 16), and 5s 
(n = 23). Children were recruited from a Protestant school in a rural, agrarian village outside 
of Kisumu, Kenya, a city on a northeastern bay of Lake Victoria in the Nyanza province. The 
Luo are one of over fifty ethno-linguistic groups of Kenya. The children are all Christian but 
practice traditional cultural customs, including practices related to ancestor spirits. Children 
generally start school between 3 to 4 years and the curriculum includes Christian religious 
education. While English and Swahili are both national languages of Kenya, these children 
primarily spoke Luo in homes, school, and in church, and was the language chosen in which 
to participate by all the children.  
These children lived in some of the poorest villages and families in the region. The 
area has been hit particularly hard by HIV/AIDS at a rate of 13.9% (UN data 2012) and the 
post-election violence of 2007-2008 during which over 1,100 died and over 600,000 were 
displaced (Humans Rights Watch, 2011). Nearly half of the Kenyan population lives under 
the international poverty line of $1.25 per day and over half of children suffer from 
malnutrition (UNICEF, 2013). Most of the parents of the children had little to no secondary 
education; many did not complete primary school.  
United Kingdom.  Seventy-one children (33 girls, 38 boys; 3:0 to 5:11 years; M = 
4.26, SD = .89) were interviewed from towns in both the midlands of England and in the 
Southeast of Scotland. Children were recruited via local nurseries, playgroups, and church 
groups. Age groups were: 3s (n = 26), 4s (n = 24), 5s (n = 21). We sampled British children 
to directly compare any methodological issues with previous samples collected in Western, 
and historically “Christian,” cultures (Lane et al., 2012; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007). All 
children were from Protestant homes, where children attended church once a week, and were 
given informal religious education at home. Children sampled were from middle to high 
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income families, with parents who were highly educated and who had obtained at least an 
undergraduate or graduate degree. All children spoke English.  
  
Procedure  
Interviews were conducted in a quiet area of a child’s home (UK, Israel), nursery 
(UK, Israel), school (DR, Kenya), or synagogue (Israel). They were conducted in the 
language most comfortable to the child. All protocols were back-translated and 
nativespeaking research assistants were employed to carry out interviews in each country. 
The study was approved by the institutional review boards for research with human subjects 
at the University of Oxford and Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary. Written 
consent was obtained from all parents or guardians and assent was obtained from each child 
(most of whom were pre-literate). Before children began any of the tasks the researcher asked 
individually whether they were willing to participate, that they would be asked some 
questions and that there were no wrong answers and they could stop at any point. Following a 
short period where the researcher made the child comfortable the experiments began by 
showing them a non-descript container (unmarked bag or box) and asked whether they knew 
the contents. Some children indicated that they did not, while many children guessed, 
assuming the researcher might be asking for a specific answer. If a child guessed, the 
interviewer said, “No, it’s not that” and clarified that, “This task is not a guessing game.  I’m 
curious to know whether you really know what is inside this container.” Since it was pivotal 
to our task that children recognized their own ignorance of the contents of the container, we 
took extra care to make sure these children realized and admitted that they had no idea what 
could be inside. We did this by asking further questions, such as “can you see inside the box” 
or “do you know for sure what is inside the bag?” After these questions, all children in each 
sample admitted they did not know.   
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After children admitted they did not know what was inside the box, they were asked 
whether the other minds (in random order) would know the contents. The interviewer asked: 
“If I showed this bag/box to [mind] and [mind] did not see what is inside the bag, would 
[mind] know what’s inside?” Children were never shown the actual contents. Following the 
task, we asked children to tell us a little about God. All children could give us a description of 
who God was (e.g., that “God answers prayers”, “is always with me”, or “is in my heart”).   
After the experiment finished, children were given stickers for participation.  
   Minds. Children were asked about two general types of minds—ordinary and 
extraordinary. British and Israeli children were asked about their Mom. However, children 
were asked about a Friend in the Kenyan sample because several children did not have a 
mother. Data collection had already been completed in Israel and the UK when data 
collection in Kenya began. To be consistent with Kenya, children in the DR were also asked 
about a Friend. All samples included God. The additional extraordinary minds, such as 
Ancestors and Angels, are explained below. All children, when asked, said that they knew 
who each of the extraordinary minds were. In light of Lane et al. (2010, 2012), we also used 
invented minds in some samples in order to explore how children think about minds when 
based only upon a simple description and not upon experience or enculturation.   
  Dominican Republic. Minds used: Friend, God, Angel. Angels abound in the biblical 
stories told to children and children are made aware of them in the home and during church 
and school lessons. Angels are not necessarily all-knowing, but they are often said to hear the 
prayers and thoughts of people, and children are taught that angels can protect them and that 
they can deliver messages to and from God.  
Kenya. Minds used: Friend, God, Ancestors, Sun. Ancestors are integral to Luo 
culture, historically and presently. Ancestors are buried on the family homestead and are 
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considered present and involved in the affairs of the living. Ancestors are talked about 
frequently in the home and especially during burials and anniversaries of deaths. They are 
said to be allies to the family, frequenting dreams to provide wisdom when honored and to 
give parents the names of their children; but they can cause trouble for those who would 
dishonor them or the homestead (Schwartz, 2000; Shipton, 1992). They are not necessarily 
all-knowing but are aware of what is going on in the family life and can intervene in daily 
life.  According to an interview with an adult member of the sample group, the Sun is part of 
the traditional pantheon of Luo religion, sometimes prayed to as “the Eye of God” 
(OlouchOdour, May 25, 2012). The Sun is not necessarily an all-knowing mind but can hear 
prayers, so may be considered to have access to information that ordinary minds do not. 
While the children were all Christian, Luo traditional religion is frequently practiced 
alongside Christian practices (Olouch-Odour, May 25, 2012). An important difference is that 
children learn about traditional religion (e.g., the ancestors and Sun) informally, in the midst 
of everyday conversations or practices. On the other hand, children receive more formal and 
intentional Christian education on a daily basis in school (as it is part of the national 
curriculum), Sunday school, and worship services in addition to everyday conversations and 
practices in the home.  
   United Kingdom and Israel. Minds used: Mom, Swec, and God. British and Israeli 
children were introduced to novel minds, similar to Lane et al. (2010; 2012), with names that 
children would not easily associate with any other being. Children were told about Swec, a 
person “who has superpowers and can see through things.” We chose a fictional, 
extraordinary mind for these samples because some extraordinary minds in these cultures are 
not strongly culturally-endorsed elsewhere (e.g., some Christian and Jewish families do not 
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speak frequently of angels). We decided to test children’s intuitive response to a fictional 
extraordinary mind with perceptual power, one the children just learned about.   
  
Results 
  Children’s answers were coded as 0 if children responded “yes” that the mind knew 
what was inside the container, and 1 if they responded “no” that the mind would not know 
what was in the container. We first analyzed whether children attribute knowledge or 
ignorance to ordinary minds and whether this developmental trend is consistent across 
cultures. We then compared these results to children’s attributions to God. Finally, we 
explore and compare how children in different countries attribute knowledge or ignorance to 
other extraordinary minds.  
  Ordinary Minds. We first examined children’s knowledge/ignorance attributions to 
ordinary minds by using a logistic regression model to examine whether age and sample 
predicted responses for the ordinary minds. We then compared British children’s responses 
with responses in Israel, Kenya, and the DR, as the UK sample most closely resembles 
samples from prior studies.   
  Age was a significant predictor for children’s responses for humans, WALD =  
3.48, p = .0005, β = 1.42, OR = 4.15.  British children’s responses also significantly differed 
from responses in the Israeli sample, WALD = 2.56, p < .0104, β = 5.99, OR = 397.69. The 
odds ratio and beta are so large because Israeli children’s responses consistently attributed 
ignorance in each age group, see Table 1. However, British children’s responses did not differ 
compared to children’s responses in Kenya, WALD = -.877, p = .3807, β = -2.25, OR = .11, 
and the DR, WALD = -1.145, p = .2523, β = 2.46, OR = 1.69. Using dummy codes for 
sample, there was a significant interaction between children’s responses in the British sample, 
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Age, and responses in the Israeli sample, WALD = -2.285, p = .0222, β = -1.31, OR = .27. 
There were no interaction effects when comparing British responses, Age, and responses in 
the DR, WALD = -1.181, p = .2376, β = -.64, OR = .52, and Kenya, WALD = .227, p = .8203, 
β = .14, OR = 1.15.    
We also tested children’s responses within each sample to explore developmental 
trends (Age) for each site. Individual logistic regressions revealed that, except for Israel, older 
children in each cultural group were more likely to attribute ignorance to the ordinary minds 
than younger children and the odds of children being more likely to attribute ignorance 
significantly increases with age, see p-values and effect sizes in Table 1. Compared to the 
other samples, Israeli children attributed ignorance to Mom consistently from an early age.  
[Table 1 here]  
Because of the differences across age, we ran separate binomial tests to examine the 
proportion of knowledge versus ignorance attributions against chance for each ordinary mind 
according to cultural sample and age group, see Table 2. These analyses showed different 
ages across samples at which children began attributing ignorance to a human (either Mom or 
Friend). Overall, Kenyan children were 5 years old, British children were 4 years old, and  
Israeli children were 3 years old before reliably attributing ignorance to either their Mom or 
Friend. The responses of Dominican children approached significance at 5 years. With the 
exception of the Israel sample, the general pattern was increasing attribution of ignorance to 
the ordinary minds with age, see Fig. 1.  
[Figure 1 here]  
  God’s Mind. Similar to the analyses for the ordinary minds, we first compared British 
children’s responses for God with the DR, Israel, and Kenya. As suggested above, the UK 
sample is used as the comparison as this sample is similar to prior work. We used a logistic 
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regression model to examine whether age and sample predicted responses for God.  Age was 
not a significant predictor, WALD = -1.754, p = .079, β = -.65, OR = .52.  Excluding age, 
there were significant differences between responses for God from the British sample 
compared to children’s responses in Kenya, WALD = -2.07, p = .038, β = -6.45, OR = .002, 
but not for responses in the DR, WALD = -1.759, p = .079, β = -3.75, OR = 0.02, or Israel, 
WALD = .588, p = .556, β = 1.24, OR = 3.44.  Using a logistic regression with dummy codes 
for sample, there were significant interaction effects between children’s responses in the 
British sample and Age for the DR, WALD = 2.08, df = 3, p = .038, β = 1.06, OR = 2.91, and 
marginally between the British sample, Age, and Kenya, WALD = 1.92, df = 3, p = .055, β = 
1.38, OR = 3.97. There was no interaction effect between British children’s responses, Age 
and the Israeli sample, WALD = -.394, df = 3, p = .694, β = -.20, OR = .815. These results 
suggest that the developmental progression of children’s attributions of ignorance follow 
slightly different trajectories.  Children’s ignorance responses from Israel and the UK 
demonstrated patterns that decreased whereas children’s ignorance responses in the DR and 
Kenya showed a pattern that increased.  In other words, the developmental trajectory of 
responses from children in the DR and Kenya appeared different from the pattern of 
responses in the British children.    
We also explored the developmental trends (Age) for children’s responses within their 
own sample. We used logistic regressions to explore Age by each sample, generating four 
different logistic regressions, see Table 1. Children in all samples and across all ages 
responded that God would know the contents of the unmarked container. In other words, the 
odds that older children compared to younger children from the DR, Israel, Kenya, and the 
UK would respond differently, such as attribute God with ignorance, was very low, see odd 
ratios in Table1.    
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[Table 2 here]  
  God’s Mind vs. Human Minds  
We also compared the responses from each sample for God and for a human as in 
prior studies (e.g. Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007). We used a Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test for 
matched pairs to analyze differences among answers for both the human mind and God used 
in each country. Results showed significant differences between the two minds at every age 
for every sample (UK, Kenya, and Israel) except for responses from 3- and 4-year-olds from 
the DR, see Table 3. That is, except for the DR, even the youngest children were 
differentiating the human minds from God’s mind. Additionally, older children consistently 
differentiated between these minds for all samples; note effect sizes in Table 3. On the whole, 
Israeli, British, and Kenyan children were more likely to attribute ignorance to the human 
mind than to God. The children in the DR show a different pattern not because they attributed 
ignorance to God, but because they were attributing knowledge to humans.   
[Table 3 here]  
  Other Extraordinary Minds. Children’s responses for extraordinary minds showed 
little variation across development. We ran individual logistic regressions, examining 
whether age predicted responses for each mind in each cultural group.  These logistic 
regressions revealed that age was not a significant predictor for whether children attributed 
knowledge to an Angel or Swec, and ignorance to the Ancestors and Sun god, see both Table 
1 and Fig. 1. Thus, children saw an Angel and Swec as having sufficient qualities to know 
what would be inside an unknown box, whereas Ancestors and the Sun god would not.  
Binomial tests confirmed the logistic regression analyses that responses for extraordinary 
minds showed similar trends across ages, see Table 2.  
Comparisons of children’s responses for the extraordinary minds to God appear in  
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Table 4. Among responses for extraordinary minds, Swec (UK and Israel) and the Angel 
(DR) were attributed knowledge of the container’s contents, and from 3 years children did not 
distinguish these minds from the mind of God (except for British 4-year-olds).  In other 
words, children at every age attributed knowledge to each of these minds. Conversely, there 
was no differentiation in responses among the Ancestors, Sun, and Friend: the Ancestors, Sun 
and Friend were attributed with ignorance at all ages, see Table 4.   
Finally, we compared ordinary and extraordinary minds (not God). British and Israeli 
children at all ages significantly differentiated between Swec and Mom, whereas children 
from the DR did not distinguish their Friend from the Angel until 5 years, again, because 
younger children also attributed knowledge to their Friend, see Table 2. Kenyan children did 
not attribute similar knowledge to the Ancestors and Sun as to God. Children attributed 
ignorance to the Ancestors and Sun. From age 3, children significantly differentiated between 
the Ancestors and God, and from age 4, significantly responded differently regarding the Sun 
and God.    
[Table 4 here]  
  
Discussion  
Extraordinary and ordinary minds are central to the social lives of children, yet we 
still do not fully understand the cognitive processes and cultural influences that encourage 
children to understand a variety of minds. The present study advances our understanding by 
contributing valuable cross-cultural data using a knowledge-ignorance task and featuring 
several different types of minds. Our results show various patterns between cultural groups 
for many different minds, suggesting a strong role for social influence upon understanding 
ordinary and extraordinary minds, even at the youngest ages. ToM development would not 
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appear to be a universally fixed pattern for either considering God, humans, or “in-betweens.” 
Consider, for example, that 80% of Israeli 3-year-olds attributed ignorance to an ordinary 
mind while only 5% of the Dominican 3-year-olds did. Dominican children were not 
projecting their own knowledge state upon others. At the same time, Israeli children clearly 
differentiated a human’s knowledge from God’s. Or consider that Kenyan children’s 
attributions of ignorance to God actually rose with age while British and Israeli children’s 
attributions of God’s ignorance dropped with age. In addition, there was no predictable 
pattern for the various other extraordinary minds either between samples or within them. An 
angel may know like God does among 5-year-old Dominican children, whereas the Ancestors 
may be more like humans among 5-year-old Kenyan children, with the Sun somewhere 
inbetween.   
The goal of this study was to address whether each sample followed a similar pattern 
of responses, particularly for God and a human mind. If patterns were largely the same, this 
would help the claim that the developmental trajectory for understanding ordinary and 
extraordinary minds follows a predictable pattern globally. That is not what we found. Based 
on the variance in our results, we conclude, along with a growing body of researchers, that 
further work exploring this cultural variation across samples is needed to better understand 
the interaction of cognitive and cultural processes that influence these differences (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Kline, Shamsudheen, & Broesch, 2018; Legare, 2017; Nielsen 
& Haun, 2016; Nielsen, Haun, Kartner, & Legare, 2017).   
Such exploration will need to focus upon both large cultural factors (e.g. religion, 
conflict tolerance, national history) that may differ between groups, as well as possible 
factors that may differ within a group (e.g. education levels, religious participation intensity, 
parenting philosophy, family dynamics). For example, the recent study mentioned above 
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(Richert, Saide, Lesage, & Shaman, 2017), found not only cultural differences between 
Muslim children’s responses on ToM tests compared to children from Christian and 
nonreligious households, more specifically they found a strong correlation between parents’ 
understanding of God’s mind and their children’s. Simply “being Muslim” or being 
“nonreligious” is not a discrete factor but instead implies a host of social interactions and 
communications that potentially impact ToM development even, or maybe especially, in 
relation to extraordinary figures. As suggested by Richert et al. (2017), future work could 
explore the frequency and the content of prayer in the home or the ways in which parents talk 
about God Indeed, children’s ability to differentiate human from God’s mind was predicted 
by their parent’s tendency to anthropomorphize (Richert et al., 2017).  Related, measuring 
frequency and content of any Credibility Enhancing Displays (CREDs), such as particular 
rituals or attendance at ceremonies, that families engage in on a regular basis could provide 
finer-grained analyses of ToM development, especially in relation to children’s understanding 
of extraordinary minds (Henrich, 2009; Lanman & Burhmester, 2017). For example, Epley, 
Waytz, and Cacioppo (2007) suggest that cultures that are predominantly Catholic have a 
higher propensity for anthropomorphism because of a belief and devotional practices that 
assume the presence of God in immanent, or tangible, forms. The point is that once the social 
world is recognized as playing a powerful role in ToM development, the possible subfactors 
within a child’s social world are legion.   
We believe the present study opens the door and increases the promise that more 
finetuned analyses will yield deeper understanding into the ToM development in a wide-
ranging social world that includes nonhuman and extraordinary minds.  
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Table  
 
Table 1. Individual logistic regressions examining age as a predictor for attributing knowledge 
or ignorance to each mind by sample.      
   B  Wald  p  R²  Exp(B)    
Cox & Snell  
 (Nagelkerke R)    
Ordinary minds  
Mom (UK)  
  
1.42  
   
12.09  
  
<.001  
  
.20 (.29)  
  
4.16  
Mom (Is)  .118  
 
.087  >.250  .001 (.002)  1.13  
Friend (K)  .780  
 
4.660    . 031+  .08 (.12)  2.18  
Friend (DR)  1.565   11.317   <.001  .26 (.35)  4.78  
Extraordinary minds  
God (UK)  
  
-.646  
   
3.07  
  
  .079  
  
.04 (.07)  
  
.52  
God (Is)  -.851  
 
5.41    . 020+  .09 (.13)  .43  
God (K)  .418  
 
1.389    .236  .03 (.04)  1.52  
God (DR)  .773   1.404    .238  .03 (.06)  2.08  
Angel (DR)  .872   .770  >.250  .02 (.07)  2.39  
Ancestors (K)  .625  
 
3.107    .078  .06 (.08)  1.87  
Sun (K)  .634  
 
3.642    . 056+  .07 (.09)  1.88  
Swec (UK)  -.13  
 
.179   >.250  .002 (.004)  .88  
Swec (Is)  -.548   3.175    .075  .05 (.07)  .58  
+  
Note. These individual logistic regression analyses are not significant because they are subject to family-wise error  
(Bonferroni-adjusted p-values for God and ordinary minds = .0125, and for other extraordinary minds = .01).  
   
  
Table 2.   
Number of children attributing ignorance or knowledge in the ignorance-belief task by each 
mind, cultural group, and age group.  
 
   3 years  4 years  5 years  
 Mind (Sample)  I  K  p/ RR  I  K  p/ RR  I  K  p/ RR  
Ordinary minds  
Mom (UK)  
  
15  
  
15  
  
>.250/ 1.00  
  
20  
  
4  
  
<.001/ 1.66  
  
19  
  
2  
  
<.001/ 1.81  
Mom (Is)  19  4  .001/ 1.65  16  2  <.001/ 1.78  19  4    .013/ 1.65  
Friend (K)  9  9  >.250/ 1.00  11  5   .105/ 1.36  19  4    .013/ 1.65  
Friend (DR)  1  18  <.001/ 1.89  6  9  >.250/ 1.20  11  6    .166/ 1.29  
Extraordinary minds 
God (UK)  
  
10  
  
20  
  
 .049/ 1.33  
  
2  
  
22  
  
<.001/ 1.83  
  
2  
  
19  
  
<.001/ 1.81  
God (Is)  9  13  >.250/ 1.18  5  13   .048/  1.44  2  21  <.001/ 1.83  
God (K)  4  14   .015/ 1.56  4  11   .039/ 1.47  9  14    .202/ 1.23  
God (DR)  0  19  <.001/ 2.00  3  12   .018/ 1.60  2  15    .001/ 1.76  
Angel (DR)  0  15  <.001/ 2.00  1  9   .012/ 1.80  1  12   .001/ 1.85  
Ancestors (K)  9  9  >.250/ 1.00  12  4   .038/ 1.50  17  5   .009/ 1.54  
Sun (K)  7  11   .240/ 1.22  10  6   .227/ 1.25  16  7   .046/ 1.39  
Swec (UK)  8  22   .008/ 1.47  6  18   .011/ 1.50  5  16   .013/ 1.52  
Swec (Is)  12  11  >.250/ 1.04  8  10  >.250/ 1.11  6  17   .017/ 1.48  
Notes. I = Ignorance. K = Knowledge.  The p values indicate the probability levels of binomial 
tests. Relative Risk (RR) is calculated as an effect size measure for whether children attributed 
more ignorance or knowledge, with an expected probability of .5, or chance responding.  
  Age  Group  
Table 2 
Table  
 
Table 3.   
Comparison of children’s responses for God and a human mind    
 
   Age Group  
 
   3 years  4 years  5 years  
Cultural Group  z  p  r  z  p  r  z  p  r  
United  
Kingdom+  
-2.45  .014  .244  -4.24  < .001  .612  -4.12  < .001  .636  
Israel+  -2.17  .007  
.404  
-3.12     .001  
.553  -4.12  < .001  .607  
Kenya  -2.24  .025  .373  -2.45     .014  .440  -3.16    .002  .619  
Dominican  
Republic  
-1  .310  .162  -1.73     .083  .316  -3.00    .003  .514  
Note. Z scores represent standardized score from Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test. +We used Mom as 
the human mind in the UK and Israel.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
4.   
Comparison of children’s responses for extraordinary minds, God, and human minds    
 
   Age Group  
 
   3 years  4 years  5 years  
 Cultural Group  z  p  r  z  p  r  z  p  r  
United Kingdom  
Swec & God  
Swec & Mom  
  
-1.00  
-2.33  
  
.317  
.020  
  
.129  
.301  
  
-2.00  
-3.30  
  
.046  
.001  
  
.289  
.476  
  
-1.73  
-3.74  
  
.083  
<.001  
  
.267  
.577  
Israel  
Swec & God  
Swec & Mom  
  
-1.41  
-2.33  
  
.157  
.020  
  
.208  
.334  
  
-1.73  
-2.83  
     
.083  
.005  
  
.288  
.472  
  
-1.63  
-3.60  
  
.102  
<.001  
  
.240  
.531  
Kenya  
Ancestors & God  
Ancestors & Friend  
Sun & God 
Sun & Friend  
  
-2.24  
.000  
-1.34  
-1.00  
  
.025  
1.00  
.180  
.317  
  
.373  
.000  
.223  
.000  
  
-2.65  
-.447  
-2.24  
-.577  
  
.008  
.655  
.025  
.564  
  
.476  
.079  
.402  
.102  
  
-3.00  
-.447  
-2.33  
-1.34  
  
.003  
.655  
.020  
.180  
  
.447  
.067  
.344  
.198  
Dominican Republic  
Angel & God 
Angel & Friend  
  
.000  
.000  
  
1.00  
1.00  
  
.000  
.000  
  
.000  
-1.41  
  
1.00  
.157  
  
.000  
.282  
  
.000  
-2.33  
  
1.00  
.020  
  
.000  
.425  
Note. Z scores represent standardized score from Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test.   
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Figure 1. Children’s knowledge/ignorance attribution to each mind by culture and age group  
Dominican Republic  Israel  
 
  
 
Kenya  United Kingdom  
 
 
Friend 
Sun 
God 
Ancestors 
 
  
 
  
  
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
3- years 4- years 5- years 
Age 
Friend 
God 
Angel 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
3- years 4- years 5- years 
Age 
Mom 
Swec 
God 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
3- years 4- years 5- years 
Age 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
3- years 4- years 5- years 
Age 
Mom 
Swec 
God 
